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The Carpenter's Apprentice

David Bell

Distractive Arts

In his influential essay of 1936 "The
Work ofArt in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", Walter Benjamin argues for
the consideration of film as a serious art
form. Of particular interest is his discussion in section XV. Here he initiates, but
does not elaborate extensively, an inquiry
into the nature of the relationship between the work of art and those who experience it. He follows this by comparing
film (the twentieth-century art) to one of
the oldest arts-architecture. In doing so,
he calls not only for a direct reconsideration of the nature of art in contemporary
society but also, by implication, the necessity for a thoroughgoing re-assessment of
our understanding of the art of building,
long believed (even and especially by
many early modernists, like Le Corbusier)
to be governed by enduring principles
based in the priority of form.
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Benjamin makes his argument specifically to counter George Duhamel's critique of the legitimacy of film as serious
art in Scenes de fa vie future. For
Duhamel, film is merely " ... a spectacle
which requires no concentration."' Not
seeking altogether to refute Duhamel on
this point, Benjamin avers this requisite
lack of concentration as an essential
quality of film and proceeds to ask if
there can be a legitimate distractive art.
Architecture he concludes is:
The prototype ofa work ofart the reception of which is consummated by a
collectivity [i.e., a social organism} in
a state ofdistraction. 2

Benjamin surmises an important point
of similarity between film and architecture to be the way each is appropriated-by a letting go of attention-and
adds this basic point about architecture:
Buildings are appropriated in a
twofold manner; by use and perception-or rather by touch and
sight... On the tactile side there is no
counterpart to contemplation on the
optical side. Tactile appropriation is
accomplished not so much by attention
as by habit. 3
Through these reflections Benjamin
seems to suggest other possibilities for
the experience of art in modernity besides those grounded principally in the
divisiveness of Cartesian perspectivalism. According to Martin Jay this particular "scopic regime", dominant in
the post-Renaissance production of
art, inculates a fixed , unblinking, disembodied point-of-view of the world
and implies the perpetual presence of a
transcendental subject which invent
objects and submits them to a magnetizing Gaze ofTruth. 4 I presume that
what Benjamin proposes is an understanding of the experience of art as
something that occurs within differentiated fields of relationships and without the conceptual device of
subject/object. This would perforce include observers who can be nothing
other than non-veridical.
In establishing terms for a philosophy of
cinema Gilles Deleuze ascertains that
relationships such as those implied by

Benjamin's distractive arts
do not belong to objects {or subjects},
but to the whole.. .[This} whole is not a
closed set, but on the contrary that by
which the set is never absolutely closed,
never completely sheltered, that which
keeps it open somewhere as if by the
finest thread which attaches it to the
rest ofthe universe. 5
When Deleuze writes of"the whole" in
relation to film it is important not to
confuse his notion of whole with those
of other film theorists, notably that of
the eminent, neo-realist Siegfried Kracauer. In Theory ofFilm, Kracauer critiques what seems to him to be the
prevalent idea that "Art" is the governing end of filmmaking. "Art" for him is
something that:
... thwarts the cinema's intrinsic possibilities...Art in film is reactionary because it symbolizes wholeness and thus
pretends to the continued existence of
beliefs which "cover" physical reality... The result is films which sustain
the prevailing abstractness.6
It is worth mentioning, given what
has been said so far about both attention and abstraction, that John Schumacher, in his book Human Posture;
The Nature of Inquiry, a work to
which I will return later, notes that
the irony of attention is that it provides us with the basis for its own abstraction from the senses. 7
Although their notions about "whole"
are very different, Deleuze and Kracauer

seem to share a belief in film's intrinsic
open-endedness as its real creative
strength. And perhaps echoes of Benjamin, who also asserts that film and its
making penetrate deeply into the web
of reality, can be heard in Kracauer's assertion that a prime characteristic of
film is its ability to explore "the texture
of everyday life", weaving together its
space, time and kaleidoscope of action
at various scales and conditions into an
"unaccountable togetherness". 8
Maya Deren, a pioneer avant-garde
filmmaker, agrees with this intimacy
between film and reality, although she
does not, like Kracauer, seem to consider film to have the onerous mission
of redeeming reality. Nor does she believe that the weaving together of film
and reality should result in a seamless
exposition. She argues that by "borrowing reality" and submitting it to
the "controlled accident", i.e. , the life
of the world which is present but independent of the filmmaker's control,
reality enters into the film. In turn she
suggests that film has the power to become reality, not just simulate it. Describing her Meshes of the Afternoon,
she states that it
is concerned with the interior experiences of an individual. It does not
record an event which will be witnessed by other persons. Rather it reproduces the way in which the subconscious ofan individual will develop, interpret and elaborate an apparently simple and casual incident into
a critical emotional experience. 9

Fig. 1. Composite photograph of Carpenter Center

For her, film is neither a realistic documentation of events, nor a representation of them; it becomes situated among
them as a result of film 's own apparatus.10 As such it is political, moral, ideological, and will always go beyond perception by putting perception within its
system, embodying it, because

Hence, the real should not be identified
with so-called normal or "natural" vision. Even outside the camera, as
Jean-Louis Comolli observes, there is the
entire invisible apparatus of the cinema. 12

the camera does not simpo/ give us the
vision ofthe character and his world; it
imposes another vision in which the
first is transformed and reflected. 11

The significant and obvious differences
between film and architecture notwithstanding, the two share other qualities
that are perhaps genetically related to

Film, Architecture, Presence

Benjamin's astute perception about distractive art. Neither @m nor architecture
seems to be predicated on presence to the
extent that other (especially plastic or visual) arts are. In fact, they both challenge
this notion. This may be because both,
albeit in very different ways, are essentially concerned with the wholeness of
motion in relationship to presence.
Andre Bazin, in his seminal What is
Cinema?, makes the case for film as a

challenge to presence by comparing it
to what is often regarded as its sister art
form-theater. 13 It is the difference between them which gives film its materaliry. Orson Welles played on this difference with multiple ironic intentions
throughout Citizen Kane, a film ultimately about the making of another
film ... the obituary newsreel of the enigma of Charles Foster Kane. In Welles'
classic film, scenes of the powerful
Kane at frequent moments in his life
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are frequently held within the proscenium-like perimeters of various windows. In these instances Kane seems
to be little more than a homunculus, a
shade, a weightless dramatis persona
scripted by others in the same film
scene. These other characters are visible but outside the boundaries of the
various windows and the transformative energies of their frames. Bazin's
analysis bears on the examination of an
exceptionally important component of
film-the frame-which Welles analogized and critiqued as the window.
More recently, Peter Greenaway analogized and critiqued the cinematic
frame as the problematic, ostensibly
neutral view-frame through the
crosshairs of which the draftsman in
the Draughtsman Contract constructed precisely drawn views of an estate.

only various shots of mise-en-scene
connected together to create a particular vision. 15 This vision is perpetually
restless. In other words, materiality,
time, space, gesture, and movement
provide the content. With this understanding, the film frame is as much a
mask as it is an opening into a world
which can seem in some indefinable
way to be coextensive with our own. It
is a mask because, as Bazin points out,
it allows only part of the action to be
seen at any given time during a film .

s

The frame in a film, Bazin contends,
is not the analog of the theatrical stage.
It is not a window to a microcosm like
the theatrical set, but an opening to an
extensive other world that, through a
willing suspension of our disbelief, has
the potential to appear to merge with
our own. But its function as such an
opening is complicated by its inherent
movement content. As Deleuze points
out, movement is an intrinsic and material property of film . Film opposes
posed or transcendental form and the
privileged gaze implicit to it.
The frame is not simply a return to
the photo: if it belongs to the cinema,
this is because it is the genetic element
of the image, or the differential element of the movement. It does not
"terminate" the movement without
also being the p rinciple ofits acceleration, its deceleration and its variation.14
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Something that moves out of the film
frame does not go into wings "off
stage", instead it moves into another
part of the realm of the film, temporarily out of sight. It is entirely possible,
Bazin argues, that substantive segments of a film may have both no actor
and no text enunciated by the actors,

Fig. 2 . Bridge-ramp at left

The out-of-frame space is constantly
with us through irs absence and as a
subtle play with the frame's edges;
events come and go, viewpoints shift.
All of this serves as a productive distraction to focused central vision.
Therefore film has the peculiar quality,
completely independent of but valuable to its existence as a narrative device, of never really presenting (or presencing) itself as a whole. In fact,
it challenges the established classical
and empirical scientific notions of
the whole as something that can be
controlled by a centered subject/
viewer/observer.
Architecture is very much like this yet
can also appear to be unlike this, especially to architects. As something experienced, architecture is constantly
masking itself. Inhabiting virtually any
constructed spaces means we can never
possess the entire situation of that inhabitation in any particular instant.
One is reminded of Benjamin's distinction between attention and habit
(It is important to understand, however, that both occur in our reception

of architecture by inhabitation) . The
sense of film with its constant movement, irs mise-en-scene always adrift,
parallels but does not duplicate the
sense of inhabitation of architecture.

is movement potent. It is not a single
cell of film , but exists only as the necessarily challenged limit for filmic
space to unfold. Through its movement it provides images, or what
Deleuze calls "movement images".
The "movement image is not an image
to which movement is added but one
to which movement is implicit.

Yet architecture, as lived experience, is
often conflated with or confused with
its own representation. Whether as
models , photographs or drawings , its
usual forms of representation are gov- The cinematic process works to extract
erned by the codes of Cartesian "pure movement from bodies or movmonocular perspectivism, the disem- ing things." 18 What is produced is not
bodied view, the depoliticized view
that suggests there are in a work of architecture immobile and transcendent
forms and spaces that are revealed and·
possessed by projecting ourselves into
its representation .
The film frame is obviously a two-dimensional entity. However, due to its
mobility (both that of the camera as
tracking instrument and camera/projector as the recorder/repeater of shifting images), it induces three- dimenstional space. According to Noel
Bi.irch, these movements suggest and
employ a transgression of the frame's
boundaries both laterally and perpendicularly to this plane. 16 Whenever the
camera pans side to side, moves in or
pulls back, it does so to reveal other
cinematic space. 17 The periphery of the
cinematic field, because of this potential out-of-fieldness, has an importance equivalent to the center of the
frame 's field . What is offscreen is allowed to become present within the
frame while being literally invisible,
e.g., a shadow or sound may "come
into" the frame as fluctuating existence. For example, in Andrei
Tarkovsky's The Sacrifice a deafening
blast of wind overwhelms the quiet celebration of an old man's birthday to
announce the outbreak of World War
III. As Gilles Deleuze points out, this
kind of spatiality (Deleuze calls it
transspatiality) occurs even in the false
continuity of montage and tends to
heighten, instead of break, the sense of
the whole as expansive, mutative and
nonself-closing. The frame therefore

Fig. 3. Cut-away axonometric (Original
drawing by Edwar Nilson, Courtesy Harvard University Press}

a static section, like that of architectural representation, but a "mobile section" constituted of extracted movements putting everything which constitutes a set (the ensemble of bodies,
events, positions to which the cinematic apparatus is directed) into variation .
The film frame inherently embodies
vision in an expanded field. This vision, however, is not limited to film .
It can stimulate our notions about the
world through other disciplinary
means. The vision manifested through
film practices is neither a matter of
psychology of perception nor one of
decontextualized images allowing an
unmediared communion between the
viewer's eye and pure form. This vision
is a cooperative, mutual construction
of the person, together as mind and
body, and the world. In an increasing
number of films of the last 40 years,
this vision has become further complicated by various temporal and spatial
displacements, accelerated wanderings

and challenges to "natural" seamless
perception. Such films question the reality our prevailing cultural and social
institutions condition us to view. 19
Vision, Movement, World

Fig. 4 . View from bridge
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In his book Human Posture: The Nature ofInquiry, referred to above, John
Schumacher20 discusses possibilities regarding motion, vision and space in
the everyday world in ways reminiscent
of some of Bazin's, Deleuze's and
Burch's discussions on the nature of
filmY Human vision is an action intimately connected to and working with
the world. Schumacher calls this seeing.
The perspectival Cartesian world-view
of classical physics and optics abstracted vision from the world and referred
it to a transcendental, outside-of-time
ego-the visual ego . Schumacher calls
this viewing, which makes objective divisions and assumes a posture of transcendental immobility, i.e., that there
is eternally present a visual
Archimedean point from which no
thing can ever be hidden or obscured.
Both seeing and viewing constitute the
way we are as humans in the world. An
important premise for the vision Schumacher discusses is the notion that to
varying degrees all events in the world
become hidden away, i.e., out of sight,
obscured, even when "in view". These
events and our seeing them are further
predicated on a sense of the visual
world, the world of seeing, in which
one IS
always embedded in an order of
movement, working with a "stretch"
of space and time, with no favored
reference point; each place-including my place-is connected to its
neighbor, that is, co-made with its
neighbor. 22
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Fig. 5. Grade level plan

"Space" in these terms is neither independent of our position in it nor of
time. The far and near sides of such a
"space" do not exist simultaneously as
in classical physics (which in fact invented space as we commonly think of
it), i.e., these sides do not really exist

in such a way that we can encompass
them completely and veridically from
a point-of-view. They exist for the
most part through our action or intervention with them. The distance between far and near cannot be abstracted from time. This vision is inherently
sensual and our predisposition to
"view" the world leads us to suppress
this sensuality.
Implicit to Schumacher's notion of
space and time is a lack of transparency. "Space" is not actually transparent
to our vision . One cannot stand impassively detached from any objects,
events, situations and their concatenations, "read" them and derive a true,
complete picture of them. Such a notion of reading is a long standing formal strategy in both the design and
criticism of architecture. As a practice,
however, it is one among many for understanding architecture and is valid
as long as one employs it with a critical reflectivity that acknowledges the
inherent opacity of the visual world. 23
Space then becomes space-time movement, and the world becomes "the
eye-head-brain-body-world
system". 24 Like the film frame, human vision is inherently a masking as well as
revealing process.
Carpenter Center
Implied in the preceding remarks is a
vast, virtually unexplored, realm of
motion and "distractiveness". An
awareness of various filmic concerns
and operations and their parallels with
lived experience can help us to expand
conceptually our current understanding of architectural theory and practice. I have chosen to examine Le Corbusier's Carpenter Center in these
terms because I think it illuminates
and illustrates some of them quite well.
I am neither trying to make a case from
the uniqueness of the Carpenter Center in relationship to these issues nor
am I trying to argue that it is representative of more general principles. And I
certainly do not see it as supplying any
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formulas for a new architecture. My
comments about it grow out of m y
own repeated, diverse experiences of
the Carpenter Center building and my
study of it within the context of Le
Corbusier's oeuvre. For several years
these have formed the nucleus of a
first-year graduate theory seminar that
I teach . Though not made out of distraction, I believe the following discussion is distractive because it is not intended to articulate the nature of this
work of architecture. Instead, I wish
to travel along and occasionally slip to
either side off that fragile boundary between articulation and the experience
of architecture.
I believe there is something to one's experiences of architectural space at the
Carpen ter Center that to an extent lies
outside any ofLe Corbusier's own pronouncements, theoretical or otherwise.
An exam ple of such divergence
emerges from examining briefly Le
Corbusier's answer to a question put to
him regarding Ronchamp and his own
religio us belief: "I h ave not experienced the miracle of faith, but I have
often known the miracle of ineffable
space. " 25 Thus, even in a denial, he put
the possibility of certain spatial experiences on the same plane with a kind of
spirituality. But, while there are mysteries of spatial experience that may lie
outside of language, this does not necessarily place them in a secularized,
neo- Platonic evocation of spirit. They
may exist in the shifting liminalities of
our everyday experiences and actions
in the world distinct from speech. 26 It
is appreciation of these experiences
that I am after.
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Le Corbusier's Carpenter Center is
governed by the principle of the section both transversally and longitudinally-especially with respect to its
bridge-ramp. However, the representation of this particular sectional control
using the conventional means of the
section drawing, even with some modifications, is very limited. I tried on
several occasions to develop a series of

sectional drawings that demonstrated
this control but was unable to do so
to my satisfaction. I concluded that
because this bridge-ramp changes continuously along its length in either orientation or elevation or both, there is
an implicit mobility, especially to its
transverse sections. These mobile sections are somehow like the conventional architectural section simply because one can unquestionably conceive of their existence. Yet, one cannot quite represent them via the convention of the architectural section,
singly or in a series like a cartoon strip.
What ultimately seems more descriptive is the kind of photo-montage, in
the manner of David Hackney, shown
in Figure 1.
Fig. 6a. View through grade level plan

Each mobile section through the
bridge-ramp must be understood conceptually as related intimately to the
others and serves as a sort of frame of
movement-image, i.e., it seems to be
an attempt by architecture to emancipate "pure movement" from the experience of traversing this site (Whether
this is possible or not must remain a
moot point in this essay.) Such a quality Le Corbusier called the "promenade architecturale" - a use of movement around and through the building
to help establish the sense of its whole.
It is a concept that figures prominently
throughout his architectural oeuvre. In
Towards a New Architecture he states:
The human eye, in its investigations,
is always on the move and the beholder himselfis always turning right
and left, shifting about. 27
Vision, for Le Corbusier, was profoundly connected to movement. This
notion was very likely inspired in large
part by his rich and rewarding experiences at the Acropolis. 28 There he confronted architecture as a fluid interplay of space, time, movement and
landscape. Yet, being an idealist, his
purposes were always to reveal some
immobile and transcendent values in
the forms and spaces of architecture.
Movement in this sense allows one to

Fig. 6b. View through grade level space from interior

Fig. 7. View from grade level lobby to underside of bridge-ramp

achieve a kind of conceptual
Archimedean point where the Idea of
the building would crystallize. This
might help to explain the sense of detachment the bridge-ramp seems to
have from the rest of the building, acting almost as a kind of viewing platform (Figures 2 & 3). However, it does
so paradoxically. It slices decisively
through the building's cubic mass to
construct a rich, deep space that utterly
belies the cube's implied centrality. It
occupies an indecisive or elusive "center", i.e., your memory of the cubic envelope, seen as you approach, allows
yo u to posit a topographical center,
presumed to be on the bridge-ramp.
Here the entire structure surrounds
you, bur yo u are not given an opportunity to command this center stationarity, if indeed you could definitely locate it. Wherever you are along the
bridge-ramp, except at its high point,
you stand on a slope and are aware that
the weight of your body is differentiated in gravity's field (The only level part
of the bridge-ramp is at its zenith and
here yo u encounter two flanking options for movement.) Even if you don't
move, movement is internalized by
your imbalance on this slope. You see
the architecture that surrounds you
and you know within your body that
this seeing is neither a disembodied nor
an immobile view. It is seeing grounded in a particular situation of forced instability and is inseperable from movement. Were this imbalance not
enough, you might also discern that
here in the building's dark heart, where
its southern perimeter of concrete
brise-soleil seems to hang in the distance like a luminous curtain of vapor,
you have a curious sense of not really
being in a building at all (Figure 4).
This bridge-ramp is clearly not the device of a transcendental revelation of
the Carpenter Center as a winged
cube. From here you are completely
oblivious to several engaging qualities
of its spaces. Such disjunction would
almost a fortiori have to be the case
given Le Corbusier' s determined use of

the Dom-Ino strategy of differentiated
spatial lamina. As Paul Venable Turner has observed, the invention of the
Dom-Ino initiated a potent and difficult fusion of Le Corbusier's innate
idealism with the positivistic architectural rationalism of August Perret; a
fusion that came to characterize many
other dimensions of the work of his career. There is, for example, at ground
level a physically differentiated but visually continuous space, the axis of
which cuts diagonally across that of the
bridge ramp (Figures 5 & 6). The
bridge-ramp is invisible to it except at a
critical point on this axis where the
west wall of the lobby opens to reveal
the underside of the bridge-ramp and
its support as placid abstractions in an
idyllic landscape (Figure 7). From the
bridge-ramp, however, the presence of
this differentiated, diagonal spatial
continuum is virtually obscured.
Completely unrelated to this lobby
space counter-axis is the startling parallactic space of the third-floor south studio. This space of shifting multiplicities has considerable tactile quality and
resists being read at a distance (Figure
8). You become absorbed with it, feeling it, moving with it, discovering the
slightly perceptible variations in the diameters of its columns, the initially
oblique and momentarily disruptive
sight of their placements as stochastic
perforations of space rather than as a
rationalized technical necessity.
In part, these perceptions result from
your line-of-motion through the entry
to this space either from the dappled
limpidity of the fire stair enclosure or
the now largely vestigial main entry at
the apex of the bridge-ramp (Figure 9).
The experience of this oblique movement must of course be coupled with
the variable and complex curvature of
the two tiered briese-soleil wall. It is
simultaneously controlled by the
Dom-Ino's linear perspective and the
contrary of this perspective-an opening of depth caused by the brisesoleil's variably accelerating concavi-
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ty. Woven into all of this, and in fact
heightening the sensation of diffuse
intensity, are the changing evidences
of life and light in and at the edges of
this studio. Perception seems somehow to merge with movement in this
superimposition, this vibrating dissolve of space and human activity.

spatial depth in the classical sense of
the "viewpoint" is annulled. The distant view seems irrelevant, covered by
this perplexing openness. Space,-that
is, naturalistic, pictorial space-past
this point seems to disintegrate, its
codes of perspectival uniformity ignored (Figure 11).

The cinematic qualities of "depth-offield" and "o ut-of-field" both have
correspondence to the experience at
Carpenter Center where it is depth-offield, in this case an architectural induction of movement, that provokes
a confrontation with the out-of-field.
Depth-of-field in the cinematic realism of Bazin' s theoty is thought to be
a way of unifying cinematic space,
making it congruent with naturalistic
pictorial space. However, both the
film theorists Jean-Louis Comolli and
Marc Vernet have argued convincingly that deep space (i.e., the space of
"deep focus ") is a pluralizing agent.30
The difference is important, because a
pluralized space may also be open and
dynamic. It can be argued that the
space of the bridge-ramp, especially as
it cuts through (i.e. literally sections)
this building, could be understood in
a purely intellectual way as the unifying concept. But you experience and
come to understand this space as plural intensities. Deep space, particularly
in the terms of Comolli and Vernet
vis-a-vis film, is an evident but very
complex phenomenon in the Quincy
Street approach . As you round the
curve on the bridge-ramp an oblique,
regulated depth momentarily opens
up (Figure 10). Then, as you assume
a frontal relationship to it, the building completely encompasses your field
of vision and loses its qualities of free
standing, detached object in the landscape. Here occurs a heterogeneous
and paradoxical play of the shallow
depths and taut surface characteristics
of the two wings framing the bridgeramp at its precipitous high point. At
this high point is an instaurant interval of blankness and emptiness where
vision is momentarily arrested and

Toward Prescott Street space falls
away along the bridge-ramp and is distorted by the obliqueness of the building wall across the street with respect
to your position. Coupled with this, as
you move, is the sensation of an enveloping and continuous outer
perimeter formed by the Prescott
Street building wall and the wall of the
Faculty Club seen piecemeal and parallactically through the brise-soleil to
the south (also when the curtains of
the Sert Gallery are drawn open the
south wall of the Fogg Museum is included in this panorama). It is here
that precise locations and reference
points to the normative Harvard grid
all become unclear and you lose the
sense of spatial ubiquity, centered control and the privilege of the eye as a
viewing apparatus. You must move
head and body all around to take it all
in, but taking it all in at once is not
possible. Despite its darkened confines
this place is no Camera Obscura. You
are in a world where vision is deterritorialized by the vacillation of parallax and an oscillation between flatness
and depth which seems to be both
Purist and primitive. Existing categories of description seem to fail with
this growing demand for rethinking or
restructuring space in expanded terms
with time and movement, in what
John Schumacher calls "an order of
co-making. "
In the end, what may be truly engaging about the Carpenter Center is how
it undoes and I believe surpasses the
ideology which it is partly intended to
represent. Its displacement of the centered, authorial subject in relation to
visibility through blankness is somewhat reminiscent of Le Corbusier's

Fig. Ba. Composite view into third floor studio
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Fig. 9. Third floor pum

earlier, more immediately obvious and
perhaps less adventurous excursions
into this deflective realm at the Villa
Schwob and La Tourette. The
space/time/movement of the Carpenter Center bridge-ramp, itself neither
inside nor outside, neither center nor
non-center, is the raison d ' etre of this
building which it pulls apart. Its distractiveness allows one to grasp only a
small piece of the visible. It works to
cancel the building's own purposes of
representivity and is the building's
"structuring disillusion".
This term , "structuring disillusion",
relevant here to concerns relating architecture and representation, is what,
as Jean-Louis Comolli states in his inquiry into the purposes of film,
... offers the offensive strength ofcinematic representation and allows it to
work against the completing, reassuring, mystifYing representations ofideology. It is that strength that is needed, and that work of disillusion, if
cinematic representation is to do
something other than pile visible on
visible, if it is, in certain rare flashes, to produce in our sight the very
blindness which is at the heart ofthis
visible. 32

Fig. Bb. View into thirdfloor studio
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